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Conducting monetary policy is a difficult
business. It’s easy enough to set a policy goal
such as price stability or low and stable infla-
tion, but because monetary policy affects the
economy with a lag, achieving those goals re-
quires an ability to peer into the future. A change
in the money supply or interest rates today won’t
affect inflation for months, or even years, down
the road. Consequently, policymakers use eco-
nomic models and forecasts to help them make
decisions.
Historically, economists and policymakers
have used two major approaches to help predict
future outcomes. The first approach relies on
large-scale statistical models of the economy that
capture historical relationships among hun-
dreds of economic variables. The second ap-
proach is simpler: focus on small models con-
taining just a few variables, such as money
growth and interest rates, that seem to provide
information about future output growth, employ-
ment, and inflation.
Unfortunately, such models can fail to give
reliable predictions, especially when factors af-
fecting the economy change in a major way.
Thus, after the oil-price shocks of the 1970s, fore-
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casting models had difficulty predicting the si-
multaneous occurrence of high unemployment
and high inflation.  In the 1980s, major changes
were made to regulations governing financial
institutions, and many models were affected by
the breakdown of formerly trusted links between
money, inflation, and output growth.  When fore-
casting models become unreliable, policymakers
and economists find it more difficult to predict
how today’s actions will affect the future.
Nature abhors a vacuum in economics no less
than in physics. As the old ways of divining the
future came under fire, new proposals quickly
emerged. Many of these proposals suggested
monetary policy be guided by, or even target, cer-
tain variables that are sensitive to the market’s
expectation of inflation, such as commodity
prices and interest rate spreads. Perhaps these
indicators could give advanced warning if in-
flation was about to accelerate, allowing
policymakers to take steps to ward it off.
Focusing on, or targeting, a small number of
expectations-sensitive indicators seems to make
life a lot simpler for policymakers. Why bother
with complicated economic models or unreliable
measures of the money supply if you can act on
a few indicators that send good signals about
future inflation or output growth? After all,
building economic models is difficult, as is try-
ing to understand the causes of inflation and
growth.
Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe
a monetary policy based primarily on expecta-
tions-sensitive forecasting indicators would be
successful in the long run. The link between these
indicators and economic outcomes is sensitive
to many factors in the economy, including the
way in which monetary policy is conducted. If
policymakers change their method of implement-
ing monetary policy in a substantive way, previ-
ously reliable forecasting relationships could
easily break down. In addition, market expecta-
tions can change for reasons unrelated to future
inflation or output growth. A policy focused too
closely on expectations-driven indicators could
easily be led astray. Another concern is the pos-
sibility of bad interaction between market expec-
tations, forecasting indicators, and monetary
policy. The result might be self-fulfilling changes
in expectations and greater economic instabil-
ity, precisely the outcome these new approaches
seek to avoid. Monetary policy is more likely to
succeed if it is guided primarily by variables tied
to the underlying causes of inflation and eco-
nomic growth and not by variables tied to expec-
tations of inflation and growth.
MONETARY POLICY:
A FORWARD-LOOKING VENTURE
Many economists and policymakers are con-
vinced monetary policy can best contribute to
maximum sustainable economic growth by de-
livering a stable price level or low and stable
inflation. (See The Benefits of Low and Stable Infla-
tion.) Because monetary policy affects inflation
with a lag, policymakers who want to keep in-
flation low and stable must rely, to some extent,
on forecasts or indicators of future inflation. In
the 1960s and early 1970s, one standard way of
predicting inflation relied on the Phillips curve.
The Phillips curve posits a link between the un-
employment rate and inflation: when the unem-
ployment rate is low, inflation is high, and when
the unemployment rate is high, inflation is low.
Before the 1970s, a stable Phillips curve seemed
evident in the data. But the relationship broke
down following the oil-price shocks and high
inflation of the 1970s.1
The breakdown of the Phillips curve returned
attention to the relationship between money
growth and inflation. A key concept for under-
standing the link between money and inflation
is money demand, which links money to prices,
interest rates, and output. Individuals and busi-
nesses need money to carry on their daily activi-
1For more on the Phillips curve, see the article by
Robert King and Mark Watson. The 1999 article by Tho-
mas Sargent contains a discussion of the breakdown of
the Phillips curve in the context of monetary policy.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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ties. The amount they wish to hold (demand)
depends on the level of interest rates, prices, over-
all activity in the economy, and the technologies
used to make payments. How does the amount
of money demanded increase? The more activity
there is in the economy, the more transactions
are occurring, so people need more money to
make purchases. When prices are higher, people
need more money to buy the same goods and
services.  When interest rates are low, people hold
more money because the cost of doing so is low.2
Evolving payments technologies that allow
people to buy and sell without holding cash or
checking account balances mean less money is
held. The increasingly widespread use of credit
cards is one example.
These relationships are summarized by the
concept of the velocity of money, a shorthand
measure of how many times a year the average
dollar changes hands. Velocity plays a key role
2Currency and demand deposits, a significant por-
tion of the money stock, pay no interest, but nonmon-
etary assets, such as Treasury bills and bonds, do. The
higher interest rates are, the more interest income people
forgo by holding currency and demand deposits, so they
hold less money. If interest rates decline, people will
hold more money.
The Benefits of Low and Stable Inflation
High and variable inflation hurts economic performance in several ways.a Variable inflation raises
the uncertainty faced by debtors and creditors.  Loan agreements typically specify an interest rate
based on the expected rate of inflation over the life of the loan.  If inflation differs from what was
expected, so will the real return debtors pay creditors differ from what was expected.  Since people
generally don’t like uncertainty, variable inflation can reduce the flow of credit in the economy.  U.S.
taxes on interest income and capital gains are not indexed to inflation, so high inflation reduces the
after-tax return on saving.   As a result, peoples’ decisions on how much to save and spend are
distorted.  And then there’s what economists call the “shoe-leather” cost of inflation: the higher the
inflation rate, the more time and resources people spend  minimizing their holdings of currency and
demand deposits; that leaves less effort and fewer resources devoted to productive activity.  Price
stability avoids these distortions.
Monetary policy in many countries reflects an emerging consensus on these benefits.  In the
United States, central bankers have emphasized a commitment to price stability as a means to achieve
maximum sustainable growth.  The governments or central banks of some countries, including the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada, have adopted numerical targets for very low
to zero inflation.  Such goals do not mean policymakers are unconcerned about short-run economic
developments.  But policymakers recognize that monetary policy affects the economy with a lag,
making it impossible to smooth out all short-run fluctuations.  Moreover, they realize that sometimes
a policy can have beneficial short-term results but unacceptable long-run consequences.b
aWhile some empirical studies, such as the one by Robert Barro, find moderate rates of inflation are
inversely related to economic growth, others find no significant correlation between the two (see the paper by
McCandless and Weber).  However, very high rates of inflation are associated with lower economic growth.
bThis conclusion is based on the debate over rules vs. discretion and the time consistency of monetary
policies.  See chapter 12 in Bennett McCallum’s book for a good discussion of discretionary vs. rule-based
policymaking.  The article by Herb Taylor and the one by Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott discuss time consistency
and economic policy.
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in the link between money supply growth and
inflation:
   inflation = money supply growth +
         growth of velocity - output growth.
In principle, policymakers can use their
knowledge of money velocity to control long-run
inflation. If velocity is constant and money grows
faster than output, the result is more money chas-
ing the same amount of goods and services in
the economy, so prices rise. Too rapid growth in
the money supply eventually leads to higher
prices and inflation.3
However, if money demand moves unpredict-
ably, policymakers can’t predict velocity and so
are uncertain about the link between growth in
the money supply and future inflation.  Unfor-
tunately, this appears to be what happened be-
ginning in the 1980s (see Unstable Money Demand
and Velocity). Economists Benjamin Friedman
and Kenneth Kuttner, focusing on the period
since 1975, have shown that the money supply
was a useful predictor of the future economy
from 1975 until the mid-1980s. But from about
the mid-1980s on, they found that the money
supply (M1 and M2) had little or no predictive
power for future inflation and output.  A study
by economists Arturo Estrella and Frederic
Mishkin, which used the monetary base and M2
as measures of the money supply, came to a simi-
lar conclusion.4 Estrella and Mishkin looked at
data since 1979 and found that the money sup-
ply didn’t predict future inflation or output well,
and it’s not a very good indicator of the stance of
monetary policy either.  In short, something hap-
pened in the 1980s that caused a serious break-
down in the link between money and economic
activity.
Why did the breakdown occur? Likely candi-
dates include technological innovation, chang-
ing financial regulations, and the financial in-
novation that both responded to and drove regu-
latory change.  For example, before 1980, banks
faced regulatory limits on the interest rates they
could pay on certain types of deposits counted
in the money supply.  In the late 1970s, short-
term interest rates were very high, so consumers
were reluctant to hold funds in deposit accounts
that didn’t pay competitive rates. Banks re-
sponded by finding a way to, in effect, pay inter-
est on checking deposits: they created negotiable
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts.  Many
other financial innovations have occurred over
the last 20 years or so, including money market
mutual funds, expanded use of credit cards, and
widespread use of ATM machines.  Financial
innovations such as these can have a great im-
pact on money demand and make that demand
unstable.5
Before the 1980s, simple models that used the
growth rate of the money supply to predict fu-
ture inflation worked fairly well, once they ac-
counted for the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. The
instability of money demand in the 1980s meant
the models started to have larger-than-usual fore-
casting errors. In short, the breakdown of the
money-demand relationship meant money
growth was no longer a reliable variable on
which to anchor monetary policy.
IF NOT MONEY GROWTH OR
THE PHILLIPS CURVE, WHAT?
Once it became clear that the simple Phillips
curve and growth of the money supply had be-
3The story is more complicated than we have made it
seem. When the Fed increases the money supply, it does
so by purchasing bonds in an open-market operation,
which increases bank reserves. Banks then increase lend-
ing, which results in more money circulating in the
economy.  In addition, changes in the money supply are
associated with changes in real activity, such as employ-
ment and output, at least in the short run.
4The monetary base consists of the currency compo-
nent of the money supply plus bank reserves.
5There is an extensive literature on the instability of
money demand. See the review article by Stephen Goldfeld
and Daniel Sichel.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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Unstable Money Demand and Velocity
The increasing instability of money demand can be easily seen in plots of short-term interest rates
and the velocity of money (Figures 1 and 2). Velocity is defined as nominal GDP divided by the money
supply.  It is a measure of how frequently money changes hands in the economy. When velocity is
high, money is turning over rapidly because a relatively small quantity of money suffices to do a
year’s transactions in goods and services in the economy. Alternatively, low velocity means  a rela-
tively large quantity of money is held to buy goods and services, so money must not be changing
hands as frequently.
Velocity is positively related to nominal interest rates. When interest rates are high, people tend to
reduce money holdings because money generally earns less interest than other assets.  With less
money held for economywide spending, velocity tends to be high. As long as velocity can be reliably
related to interest rates (or other variables), all is well. But if the relationship changes, the Fed will have
trouble figuring out how much
money to supply to the economy.
For M1, the trends of velocity
and interest rates were similar up
until the early 1980s:  interest
rates were generally rising as was
velocity. In addition, velocity was
not very sensitive to swings in
interest rates. The combination
made it easy to predict M1 veloc-
ity. After that, velocity started to
show much wilder swings than
before, and even though interest
rates came down quite a bit in
the 1990s, velocity didn’t. The re-
lationship between M2 velocity
and interest rates also broke
down, though the timing is dif-
ferent. The link between velocity
and interest rates held up fairly
well until the early 1990s: M2 ve-
locity moved closely with inter-
est rates. After that, M2 velocity
increased dramatically at the
same time interest rates declined.
The breakdown of the link
between velocity and interest
rates is a symptom of unstable
money demand. Policymakers
found  the money supply was be-
coming unreliable in that it did
not do well in predicting future
economic outcomes.
*Two-month moving average
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come increasingly unreliable for setting monetary
policy, a search for alternative indicators com-
menced. In the mid-1980s, inflation averaged
about 4 percent, but people retained vivid memo-
ries of inflation that exceeded 10 percent in 1979
and 1980. Concerns about inflation were re-
flected in early suggestions that monetary
policymakers try to stabilize commodity prices,
an action that, it was argued, would lead to gen-
eral price stability in the economy.6
The notion that monetary policy should sta-
bilize commodity prices or commodity-price in-
dexes met with a good deal of skepticism. Many
commodity prices are very volatile and seem to
move in response to factors other than move-
ments in the general price level. If policymakers
tried stabilizing commodity prices, they would
have to respond to sources of volatility that have
little to do with inflation. Though the proposal
to stabilize commodity prices was flawed, some
economists and policymakers argued that com-
modity prices could still play a useful role in
formulating monetary policy. If commodity
prices were good predictors of inflation, they
might be useful indicators of inflationary pres-
sures in the economy, even if they were not good
targets for policy. 7  After all, a desirable mon-
etary policy is one that responds to inflationary
pressures well before actual inflation begins to
rise.  Perhaps by focusing on other predictors of
inflation, rather than variables such as money
growth and unemployment, policymakers could
better achieve goals of low inflation and long-
run price stability.
EXPECTATIONS, INDICATORS,
AND MONETARY POLICY: CAVEATS
Unfortunately, even if a proposed indicator
has been a good predictor of inflation, it may not
be a good guide for monetary-policy decisions.
If the indicator is driven by market expectations
of inflation, it may respond to changes in under-
lying causes of inflation. But it may also respond
to other factors, ones unrelated to future infla-
tion. In the latter case, policymakers face greater
uncertainty about the signal an indicator gives:
false signals are likely.
Suppose policymakers rely on variables, such
as the price of gold, that are driven by market
expectations about inflation. If expectations
about future inflation change, it doesn’t matter
whether those expectations are well founded—
the price of gold today will change.  If many
people start to believe inflation will be higher in
the future, that belief will be reflected in higher
gold prices, even if the fundamentals of the
economy are unchanged. Other potential indi-
cators that are sensitive to market expectations
are spreads between long-term and short-term
interest rates and survey-based measures of in-
flation expectations. Of course, these variables
respond to other economic factors besides
changes in inflation expectations. Gold prices
respond to discoveries of new gold deposits and
extraction techniques and to wars.  Interest rate
spreads may change in response to financial
uncertainties, such as those brought about by
the recent Asian crisis.  In addition, changes in
the way expectations are formed can lead to large
swings in expectations-driven indicators.
Pitfalls When Using Expectations-Driven In-
dicators for Policymaking. Michael Woodford’s
article discusses several pitfalls for policymakers
who focus too narrowly on expectations-driven
indicators that have forecasted inflation in the
past.
First, as people recognize that monetary
policy has shifted its focus to a new set of fore-
casting indicators, those indicators can become
unreliable. The basis for this idea is the Lucas
6Michael Woodford’s article has references to propos-
als that monetary policy be guided by commodity prices.
7Some advocates for using commodity prices to gauge
inflationary pressures came from within the Federal Re-
serve System. See the speeches by Federal Reserve Board
governors Wayne Angell, Robert Heller, and Manuel
Johnson. In general, the empirical evidence suggests  that
commodity prices are not very good predictors of infla-
tion. See the article by Michael Woodford for a brief re-
view of the literature and references.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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critique, named after Nobel Prize-winning
economist Robert E. Lucas, who pointed out that
the beliefs of households and firms about the
conduct of monetary and fiscal policy are im-
portant determinants of economic behavior. (See
The Lucas Critique.)  In making economic deci-
sions, households and firms take into account
their beliefs about the course of economic policy
and how it will affect them. When policy
changes, new beliefs are formed, and economic
decisions can then change.
What does this mean for monetary policy?
Suppose policymakers announced that hence-
forth the price of gold will be targeted because
gold prices are sensitive to expectations about
inflation. Once policy is switched, the old link
between gold prices and inflation would almost
certainly change, since individuals would buy
and sell gold with the knowledge that
policymakers are responding to its price.
Policymakers would then have to figure out how
to interpret the new relationship between gold
prices and inflation expectations. The same po-
tential problem would be faced with any vari-
ables driven primarily by expectations about
inflation or output growth. If policymakers be-
gin to target these variables, it may well happen
that their usefulness as forecasters of future in-
The Lucas Critique
In 1976, Robert Lucas published a now-famous article arguing that the large-scale macroeconomic
models then in vogue could, in principle, provide no useful information about the actual consequences
of alternative monetary and fiscal policies, even though the models might be very good at short-term
forecasting.a The argument became known as the Lucas critique and has been very influential in
macroeconomics.
The core of Lucas’s argument is the recognition that expectations about policy are an important
ingredient in the behavior of households and firms. Implicit in the estimated large-scale models were
a set of beliefs by households and firms about the future course of monetary and fiscal policy. If
policies changed substantially, new beliefs would be formed, and households and firms would change
their behavior. Thus, it made little sense to use models estimated under one set of beliefs to evaluate
the consequences of economic policies that would generate new beliefs and different behavior. Mod-
els estimated under the old beliefs would likely give incorrect answers.
One way to think about Lucas’s point is in terms of a game: if the rules of the game change, the
players will adapt to the new environment by changing their behavior. We can develop an analogy in
terms of a football game.b Football fans will have noticed that, during the 1998 season, the Philadelphia
Eagles almost always punted when confronted with a fourth down in their own territory. It didn’t
matter whom the Eagles were playing or where; it was a safe bet they would punt on fourth down
when in their own end of the field. On the basis of this history, we would do well to predict that the
Eagles would continue to punt on fourth down, and we wouldn’t need any understanding of football
to be right most of the time. But suppose we want to analyze a change in the rules. The new rules state
that teams get six attempts to make a first down. For anyone who understands football, it is clear that
our old model, which says the Eagles punt on fourth down, will not predict well in the new environ-
ment: the Eagles will change their behavior in response to the new policy.
aSee the article “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.”
bThe football analogy was originally developed in a 1986 article by Thomas Sargent.
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flation and growth will change dramatically.
A classic example of this phenomenon is what
happened to the Phillips curve in the early 1970s.
As discussed earlier, the Phillips curve suggests
an inverse link between the unemployment rate
and inflation. Before the 1970s, this relationship
was apparent in the data. But once policymakers
accepted higher inflation to avoid higher unem-
ployment in the 1970s, they found the relation-
ship changed. Households and firms revised
their expectations about future inflation as in-
flation remained high. Expecting higher infla-
tion, workers adjusted their views about the real
payoff to working additional hours and about
their wage demands; the result was that higher
unemployment no longer meant lower inflation.
The old link between inflation and unemploy-
ment deteriorated when workers changed their
beliefs about future inflation. Nowadays, most
economists reject the notion of a stable long-run
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
A second pitfall is that just because a variable
doesn’t forecast inflation or output growth
doesn’t mean it should be ignored. An example
from outside the world of economics might be
helpful. If you step on the gas pedal of a running
car, the car will accelerate. But suppose you are
in a dual-control car, and whenever you step on
the gas, someone sitting next to you steps on the
brake. Someone who only sees you pushing on
the gas pedal might falsely conclude there isn’t
much of a relationship between that action and
the car’s acceleration.
So, too, with economic variables.  Suppose
accelerating wage growth indicates higher fu-
ture inflation. If the central bank used tighter
monetary policy to offset accelerating wage
growth, it would appear as if there were little or
no relationship between wage growth and in-
flation–even though wage growth was an im-
portant variable for policymaking. So, a variable
may lack forecasting power because it is already
being used in making decisions. In that case, it
looks as if the variable is not helpful in making
forecasts, even though it is tied to subsequent
outcomes. In such a case, we would need a de-
tailed statistical model of the underlying rela-
tionships in order to uncover the usefulness of
the variable.
There is a third pitfall to beware of when us-
ing expectations-driven variables to guide mon-
etary policy: the possibility for bad interactions
between policy actions and forecasting variables.
Expectations could become self-fulfilling, and
the economy could become more volatile.  Sup-
pose the central bank uses the following policy
rule: whenever three-month interest rates rise
more than one percentage point above 10-year
interest rates, the central bank will increase the
growth rate of the money supply, and whenever
10-year interest rates rise more than one percent-
age point above three-month interest rates, the
central bank will decrease the growth rate of the
money supply. This policy might seem sensible,
since, in the past, when three-month rates rose
well above 10-year rates, the economy often
ended up in a recession, and when 10-year rates
rose much higher than three-month rates, it of-
ten signaled accelerating inflation.
Imagine that for some reason, perhaps an
unexpected jump in oil prices, people think there
will be a temporary rise in inflation, one that
will taper off in the next year or so. The rise in
expected inflation causes three-month interest
rates to jump up right away; once inflation tapers
off, rates are expected to fall back to normal lev-
els. As a result of this expected pattern, three-
month interest rates rise above 10-year interest
rates. If policymakers respond too aggressively
and pump a lot of money into the economy, the
belief that there will be higher inflation could be
ratified by substantially higher actual inflation.
Thus, the mere expectation of inflation could
become self-fulfilling, and the economy could
destabilize under this policy rule. The key factor
is that interest rate spreads are heavily influ-
enced by expectations. Policymakers may find
they are reacting to these expectations in a way
that affirms changes in beliefs that aren’t tied to
economic fundamentals.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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BETTER ECONOMIC MODELS
TO THE RESCUE?  NOT YET
The many problems with using expectations-
influenced forecasting variables to guide mon-
etary policy suggest we shouldn’t be too quick
to turn away from economic models when try-
ing to understand the behavior of the economy
and the implementation of monetary policy.
Many economists argue that forecasting models
broke down in the 1970s and 1980s because they
were not built up from first principles of  house-
hold and business behavior: they were not suffi-
ciently explicit about the underlying factors gov-
erning household choice and business invest-
ment.  Ideally, the way to assess how forecasting
relationships change when policy changes is to
have a model that is precise about what causes
what in the economy. Such models can trace the
effects of policy changes on the economy because
they are explicit about the links between vari-
ables that cause inflation and growth; the deci-
sions of households, firms, and policymakers;
and final outcomes.8 Since the models are ex-
plicit about the fundamental determinants of
economic behavior and the formation of expec-
tations, alternative monetary policies can be fed
into the models, and the effects on variables such
as inflation, employment, and output growth
can be examined. In addition, we could, in prin-
ciple, trace how expectations-driven variables
are affected by alternative policies.
This is a great idea in theory, but where do we
get such models? Macroeconomists have been
hard at work on models of the economy for quite
some time, but there is, as yet, no consensus on
models or modeling strategies.9  Some economists
believe business-cycle fluctuations are driven
primarily by demand-side factors, such as the
money supply, investment, and consumption.
Others attribute business-cycle fluctuations pri-
marily to supply-side factors, such as techno-
logical progress.  As a result, we have a menu of
models from which to choose when investigat-
ing the consequences of alternative monetary
and fiscal policies. This variety of models may
not reveal truth, but it does help us analyze which
differences in models are important for generat-
ing different predictions about policy responses
and outcomes. Different models give us alterna-
tive ways to sort out and interpret economic data
and allow us to frame questions and investigate
implications more clearly.
WHAT CAN POLICYMAKERS DO?
Absent a reliable link between the money sup-
ply and inflation or a completely trustworthy
model of the economy, how can a successful
policy be implemented?  Since the early 1990s,
policymakers have found themselves in the po-
sition of not having a completely trustworthy
indicator for use in setting monetary policy. De-
spite this, the performance of the economy has
been quite good: inflation is low and the economy
has been expanding since April 1991.
Economists have investigated an approach
that potentially avoids the pitfalls of narrowly
focusing on expectations-driven indicators to
guide monetary policy: design explicit rules that
tell policymakers how to adjust variables they
control directly (the federal funds rate or the
monetary base) in response to observed devia-
tions of target variables (inflation or nominal
8Robert E. Lucas’s 1977 article contains a nontechni-
cal discussion of many of these points.
9Much work has been done over the last 20 years on
building better foundational models for policy analysis,
for example, the paper by Eric Leeper and Christopher
Sims, and the book edited by Thomas Cooley. These
sources offer examples of what economists call stochas-
tic, dynamic, general equilibrium models. One key dif-
ference between these newer models and older, large-
scale statistical models is that the newer models have
restrictions across equations that account for how people
respond to perceived changes in monetary and fiscal
policies. In addition, the new models are based explicitly
on the utility and profit-maximizing behavior of house-
holds and firms.
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GDP) from values policymakers consider desir-
able.10 Such rules are less prone to the problems
that arise when people change the way they form
expectations. However, these rules can still be
adversely affected by a change in the economy
that alters the links between the variables
policymakers control and the variables they ul-
timately care about.
Frederic Mishkin, in a 1997 article, argues that
many central bankers have been following what
he calls the “just do it” strategy, in which pre-
emptive moves are made against inflation and
recession. This strategy differs significantly from
one that focuses narrowly on a small set of ex-
pectations-driven indicators. Under the “just do
it” strategy, policymakers pay attention to many
economic variables and use a variety of models
in an effort to cut off inflationary pressure well
before inflation actually increases. They also act
to forestall a recession before it begins.  There is
no clearly articulated, explicit strategy for mak-
ing monetary policy, but the strategy is coherent
nonetheless. The policy is not very transparent,
since markets don’t know for certain how
policymakers are reading the economy at any
given moment. But the policy has been pretty
successful so far: U.S. inflation is below 2 per-
cent, the unemployment rate is well below 5 per-
cent, and real output has been growing for eight
years.
But even under such a strategy, policymakers
have to look at economic indicators to judge the
stance of monetary policy and assess inflation-
ary pressures. Thus, the warnings we raised
about expectations-driven indicators are still
important. That is not to say that such indica-
tors are not useful. Policymakers must get a sense
of how financial markets expect the future to
unfold.  However, focusing too narrowly on these
variables can quickly lead to the problems enu-
merated above.
10We have in mind Taylor’s rule and McCallum’s rule.
See the article by John Taylor and the one by Bennett
McCallum for details.
Mishkin points out some drawbacks to the
“just do it” approach that could lead to trouble
in the future.  For one, the lack of transparency—
the fact that markets can’t look at a specific set of
indicators and infer how policymakers are read-
ing the economy—could result in greater finan-
cial and economic uncertainty. As a result, the
economy may not operate as efficiently as it oth-
erwise might. Another drawback is that the suc-
cess of the “just do it” approach depends on the
individuals who make policy decisions. Indi-
vidual policymakers can differ in their abilities
and in their ranking of various policy objectives.
Under a “just do it” approach, a change in the
persons making policy can more easily lead to a
change in economic outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The fact that monetary policy affects the
economy with a lag means that central bankers
have to make decisions today based on how they
expect policy to affect output and inflation in
the future.  In assessing the likely consequences
of policy actions, policymakers must pay atten-
tion to variables tied to the ultimate causes of
inflation. In the past, the money supply filled
that role, but it became increasingly unreliable
as a tool for the conduct of policy. The alterna-
tive of focusing on a narrow set of expectations-
driven indicators raises its own set of problems.
Forecasting indicators sensitive to expectations
can easily lead policy astray and become unreli-
able when they become the focus of policy.
The best way to understand the interrelation-
ship of monetary policy and forecasting indica-
tors is to develop models of the economy that are
explicit about the fundamental determinants of
households’ and firms’ choices about spending
and investment. By focusing on variables tied to
the fundamental causes of inflation and not
solely on expectations-driven variables, mon-
etary policymakers are more likely to achieve the
goal of low and stable inflation. Building better
models of the economy is an ongoing project for
macroeconomists.Jack of All Trades? Product Diversification in Nonfinancial Firms Mitchell Berlin
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Unfortunately, policymakers do not yet have
the luxury of models that closely match the U.S.
economy and are always usable for policy analy-
sis. Consequently, the current policy regime is
eclectic: policymakers look at many variables
and different models to gauge the appropriate
stance of policy and the degree of inflationary
pressure.
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